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Abstract 
Background: People who use drugs (PWUD) are known to fear calling emergency medical services (EMS) for drug 
overdoses. In response, drug‑related Good Samaritan Laws (GSLs) have been widely adopted in the USA and Canada 
to encourage bystanders to call emergency medical services (EMS) in the event of a drug overdose. However, the 
effect of GSLs on EMS‑calling behaviours has been understudied. We sought to identify factors associated with EMS‑
calling, including the enactment of the Canadian GSL in May 2017, among PWUD in Vancouver, Canada, a setting with 
an ongoing overdose crisis.
Methods: Data were derived from three prospective cohort studies of PWUD in Vancouver in 2014–2018. Multivari‑
able logistic regression was used to determine factors associated with EMS‑calling among PWUD who witnessed 
an overdose event. An interrupted time series (ITS) analysis was employed to assess the impact of GSL on monthly 
prevalence of EMS‑calling.
Results: Among 540 eligible participants, 321 (59%) were males and 284 (53%) reported calling EMS. In multivariable 
analysis, ever having administered naloxone three or more times (adjusted odds ratio [AOR] 2.00; 95% confidence 
interval [CI] 1.08–3.74) and residence in the Downtown Eastside (DTES) neighbourhood of Vancouver (AOR 1.96; 95% 
CI 1.23–3.13) were positively associated with EMS‑calling, while living in a single occupancy hotel (SRO) was nega‑
tively associated with EMS‑calling (AOR 0.51; 95% CI 0.30–0.86). The post‑GSL enactment period was not associated 
with EMS‑calling (AOR 0.81; 95% CI 0.52–1.25). The ITS found no significant difference in the monthly prevalence of 
EMS‑calling between pre‑ and post‑GSL enactment periods.
Conclusion: We observed EMS being called about half the time and the GSL did not appear to encourage EMS‑
calling. We also found that individuals living in SROs were less likely to call EMS, which raises concern given that fatal 
overdose cases are concentrated in SROs in our setting. The link between many naloxone administrations and EMS‑
calling could indicate that those with prior experience in responding to overdose events were more willing to call 
EMS. Increased efforts are warranted to ensure effective emergency responses for drug overdoses among PWUD.
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Introduction
Drug overdoses are now one of the leading cause of acci-
dental deaths in Canada and the USA [1, 2]. In most drug 
overdose cases, death occurs as a result of hypoxia, a 
condition requiring the attention of emergency medical 
services (EMS) as complications can easily arise [3, 4]. 
Of concern, people who use drugs (PWUD) are known 
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to have fear about EMS-calling as calling an emergency 
number 911 in Canada and the USA can attract police 
to the scene [4–11]. Previous studies have reported pos-
sible repercussions associated with calling EMS among 
PWUD, including arrest and harassment by the police, 
and a subsequent loss of publicly funded housing or cus-
tody of children [7, 8, 12–14]. Thus, many PWUD report 
managing overdose situations independently by using 
first aid measures (e.g., cardiopulmonary resuscitation) 
and/or naloxone, a pharmacological antidote to an opi-
oid overdose [6, 9, 12, 15]. However, multiple naloxone 
administrations are needed against potent opioids due to 
naloxone’s short duration of action [16–18]. Also, owing 
to the increased presence of highly potent synthetic opi-
oids (i.e., fentanyl) in the unregulated drug supply [19–
21], there exists a considerable need for EMS to attend 
suspected overdose cases [16, 19–23].
In response, Canada and 46 states in the USA have 
enacted drug-related Good Samaritan Laws (GSLs) 
aimed at reducing fear of legal repercussions when an 
overdose occurs through the provisions of some legal 
amnesties [24, 25]. In May 2017, the “Good Samaritan 
Drug Overdose Act” (GSA) was federally enacted in Can-
ada to provide immunity from the arrest, charge, or pros-
ecution of drugs possessed for personal use and related 
breach of conditions (e.g., probation orders, parole) when 
EMS is called to an overdose event [24, 25]. The protec-
tions of GSLs in the USA are similar, but vary by state 
[25]. To date, the body of evidence on the effectiveness 
of these laws is mixed [26–28]. Studies show that PWUD 
have low levels of knowledge of these laws and the effect 
of GSLs on EMS-calling behaviours has been understud-
ied [26]. A study in Indiana, USA, found that awareness 
of the state’s GSL was associated with having called 911 
among lay overdose responders (n = 217) [29]. However, 
this study did not account for potential confounders and 
the measurement of “awareness” (whether individuals 
had heard of the law) cannot discern whether partici-
pants had knowledge of the protections provided by the 
law. In a study in New York, USA, correct knowledge of 
the state’s GSL was associated with calling EMS com-
pared to those with incorrect knowledge, after adjusting 
for socio-demographic factors [12]. However, this study 
measured knowledge among individuals immediately 
after receiving overdose rescue training that included 
education of the GSL, and not among PWUD in commu-
nity settings.
Within the past two decades, research has identi-
fied several factors associated with EMS-calling among 
PWUD, including: being trained to administer nalox-
one [30], having administered naloxone [29], having 
previously witnessed an overdose [9], having a female 
bystander at the scene of the overdose [9], when the 
overdose victim is male [31], and when rescue breathing 
is performed [31]. In contrast, those with prior overdose 
experience and the presence of four or more bystanders 
were less likely to call EMS [9]. Other reasons for not 
calling EMS included: no ownership of a cell phone [14, 
32], fear of endangering personal relations [8, 12], and if 
the overdose occurred in a private setting [6, 7, 12, 31].
The current study sought to compare the prevalence of 
calling EMS before and after the enactment of the GSA 
among community-recruited PWUD who witnessed an 
overdose event. We also sought to identify a range of 
individual factors (e.g., experience using naloxone, drug 
use patterns, accurate knowledge of the GSA) and social–
structural exposures (e.g., negative encounters with 
police, sex work, drug dealing, incarceration) that may 
be associated with calling EMS. To guide this exploratory 
analysis, we drew on Rhodes’ Risk Environment frame-
work [33]. This framework conceptualizes drug-related 
harm as a product of individuals interacting with macro- 
and micro-levels of various physical, social, economic, 
and political environmental factors [33]. In this context, 
an individual’s decision to call EMS when an overdose 
occurs is influenced by interactions with many dimen-
sions of the risk environment. For instance, research has 
shown that PWUD are deterred from calling EMS when 
an overdose occurs (individual-level factor) as a result of 
police presence and aggressive law enforcement practices 
at overdose events (micro-social environment) [8, 11, 
13], which is driven by the structural criminalization of 
PWUD (macro-policy environments) [33]. We further 
explored the relationship between accurate knowledge 
of the GSA and calling EMS during the post-enactment 
period. Our study constitutes an important explora-
tory step needed to understand the social and structural 
exposures that may shape EMS-calling behaviour among 
community-recruited PWUD in Vancouver, an epicentre 
of the ongoing drug poisoning crisis in Canada.
Methods
Study setting and design
Data were drawn from three ongoing prospective cohort 
studies of PWUD in Vancouver, Canada: the Vancou-
ver Injection Drug Users Study (VIDUS), the AIDS 
Care Cohort to evaluate Exposure to Survival Services 
(ACCESS), and the At-Risk Youth Study (ARYS). VIDUS 
enrols HIV-seronegative adults (≥ 18  years of age) who 
injected unregulated drugs in the month prior to enrol-
ment. ACCESS enrols HIV-seropositive adults who used 
an unregulated drug other than or in addition to canna-
bis (which was a controlled substance during the study 
period) in the month prior to enrolment. ARYS enrols 
street-involved youth aged 14 to 26  years who used an 
unregulated  drug other than or in addition to cannabis 
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in the month prior to enrolment. The studies use harmo-
nized data collection and follow-up procedures to allow 
for merged data analyses. All three cohorts are adminis-
tered harmonized questionnaires by trained interview-
ers at equal follow-up frequency (i.e., every six months). 
At the end of each study visit, participants receive a $40 
CAD (Canadian dollar) honorarium. Further details of 
the three cohorts are available elsewhere [34–36]. All 
three cohorts have received ethics approval from the 
University of British Columbia/Providence Health Care 
Research Ethics Board.
In the primary analysis, data collected between Decem-
ber 2014 to May 2016 (“pre-enactment period”) and June 
to November 2018 (“post-enactment period”) were uti-
lized, with a gap in data between May 2016–May 2018 
due to the witnessed overdose and response questions 
being removed from the questionnaire during this period. 
Questions used to evaluate the accuracy of knowledge of 
the GSA (described below) were added to the post-enact-
ment period questionnaire.
Primary outcome measure
The primary outcome of interest was a binary meas-
ure (yes vs. no) of “Called EMS” derived from partici-
pants who responded “yes” to the question: “Have you 
witnessed an overdose in the last six months?” and 
responded “I called 911” to the subsequent question: 
“What happened in response to this last time?”. Other 
possible responses to this question included: “I adminis-
tered Narcan”, “Someone else called 911”, “Person came to 
on their own”, “I helped”, “Someone else helped”, “Ambu-
lance came”, “I left”, or “I was at a supervised consump-
tion site”. Participants could select as many responses as 
appropriate. We used descriptive statistics to summarize 
these other responses to the witnessed overdose event 
among those who called EMS.
Study sample
The present study included individuals who had who had 
witnessed an overdose event and used any drugs in the 
past six months during the study period. The sample was 
further restricted by the exclusion of witnessed overdose 
events where the respondent did not call EMS, but EMS 
arrived at the scene or was not needed (details shown 
in Fig.  1). Thus, the following overdose responses were 
excluded: “Someone else called 911”, “Ambulance came”, 
“At a supervised consumption site”, and “Person came 
to on their own”. We excluded these events as they did 
not require the respondent to call EMS. Based on these 
criteria, the starting sample of 1128 participants was 
restricted to 540 participants, who provided a total of 660 
observations. Among the 540 participants, 101 (18.7%) 
provided more than one observation, with 50 (9.3%) 
participants contributing observations in both the pre- 
and post-enactment periods and 51 (9.4%) contributing 
repeat measurements only in the pre-enactment period. 
For the primary analyses (described below), because 
only the minority (9.3%) provided observations in both 
the pre- and post-enactment periods, we restricted the 
analytic sample to the participant’s most recent observa-
tion (120 observations excluded, and 540 observations 
remained) to conduct a cross-sectional analysis. These 
participants were divided into pre- (n = 262) and post-
enactment (n = 278) samples. For the secondary analyses 
(described below), we utilized the full 660 observations.
Primary analyses: factors associated with calling EMS
For this part of the analyses, the analytic sample only 
included the participants’ most recent observation as the 
majority of the sample only contributed one observation 
during the study period. Covariates were selected based 
on prior literature [9, 14, 29–32], and the hypothesized 
relationships between the explanatory variables and call-
ing EMS according to the Risk Environment framework 
[33]. The explanatory variables of interest included the 
following socio-demographic characteristics: age (con-
tinuous); ancestry (white vs. non-white); gender (male 
Fig. 1 Schematic diagram of the study sample and analyses. 
Between December 2014 to May 2016 and June 2018 to November 
2018, 1128 people who use drugs in Vancouver, Canada had 
witnessed an overdose event. *The sample was further restricted 
by the exclusion of witnessed overdose events (n = 608) where 
the respondent did not call EMS, but EMS arrived at the scene 
or was not needed. For the primary cross‑sectional analyses, we 
utilized the most recent observations only among the analytic 
sample (120 observations excluded) to identify factors associated 
with EMS‑calling. For the secondary analyses, which involved an 
interrupted time series analysis, we utilized the full 660 observations 
of the analytic sample and divided the observations into pre‑ and 
post‑enactment of the Good Samaritan Drug Overdose Act samples
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vs. non-male); education (< secondary school educa-
tion vs. ≥ secondary school education); residence in 
the Downtown Eastside neighbourhood of Vancouver 
(DTES), an area known as an epicentre of unregulated 
drug use and marginalization in British Columbia [37]; 
place of residence (homeless vs. single room occupancy 
[SRO] accommodations vs. other [e.g., apartment, house, 
no fixed address]). Drug use related variables included: 
injection drug use (≥ daily vs. < daily); use of heroin 
(≥ daily vs. < daily); use of stimulants (≥ daily vs. < daily), 
defined as powder/crack cocaine or crystal metham-
phetamine; use of cannabis (≥ daily vs. < daily); and ever 
experienced a non-fatal overdose. Other social/structural 
exposures included: involved in drug dealing; witnessed 
a known person’s overdose; ever had a negative police 
encounter (stopped, searched or detained by the police); 
ever experienced incarceration; involved in sex work 
(exchanged sex for gifts, food, shelter, clothes, or money); 
and ever administered naloxone, derived from the ques-
tion: “Have you administered Narcan/naloxone to any-
one in the last six months?” and the subsequent question: 
“(If yes) How many times?”. Responses were then coded 
as: “Did not administer” (reference category), “one or 
two times”, or “three or more times”. We also included a 
variable of “time” to adjust for any time-related effects 
between the pre- (time = 0) and post-enactment period 
(time = 1). All behavioural variables referred to the past 
six months and all variables were coded as yes versus no, 
unless otherwise stated. We used bivariable and multi-
variable logistic regression to identify factors associated 
with calling EMS. Time was included into the multivari-
able model to adjust for its effect on other covariates.
Secondary analyses: the impact of the GSA on EMS‑calling
An interrupted time series analysis with segmented 
regression was used to evaluate the impact of the GSA 
enactment on the monthly prevalence of EMS-calling 
(in percentage), using all eligible observations [38, 39]. 
After dividing the analytic sample data into pre- and 
post-intervention segments, linear regression was used 
to compute the change in intercept post-enactment to 
measure the prevalence level change of EMS-calling pre- 
and post-enactment, as well as trends in the level change 
(measured by changes in the slope) following the GSA 
enactment [38, 39]. The linear regression did not con-
trol for factors in the primary analysis. Seasonality was 
accounted for using the Webel–Ollech overall seasonality 
test, with no evidence of seasonality observed (p = 0.542). 
To account for autocorrelation, we examined the residu-
als and autocorrelation function plots of the preva-
lence of EMS-calling, with no abnormalities observed 
in both plots. We further conducted a Breusch–God-
frey test and observed no evidence of autocorrelation in 
the prevalence of EMS-calling (p = 0.499) [39]. We also 
tested for differences in sample characteristics among the 
pre- and post-enactment samples using Pearson’s Chi-
squared test and Fisher’s test for counts < 5 (for categori-
cal variables) or the Mann–Whitney test (for continuous 
variables) as appropriate.
In the sub-analysis, among the post-enactment sample, 
we also evaluated the accuracy of “knowledge of the GSA”, 
we asked participants: “Imagine you witnessed an over-
dose in a public place. 911 is called and the police come 
to the scene. Do you think the police can legally arrest 
you if: you have a small amount of drugs on you (scenario 
A), you have a larger amount of drugs on you or items 
(scale, etc.) that may look like you are involved in drug 
dealing (scenario B), and you are in a red/no-go zone you 
received for a previous charge that was not simple drug 
possession (scenario C)”. This question was created in 
consultation with a local lawyer who has expert knowl-
edge about the GSA and informed by public educational 
material on the GSA that was created and disseminated 
by the local lawyer’s group [40]. Participants were cate-
gorized as having accurate knowledge of the GSA if they 
identified that scenario A was the only instance where 
the police could not legally arrest when EMS is called to 
an overdose (due to protections provided by the GSA) 
[24]. We examined the association between this variable 
and the outcome using the Pearson’s Chi-squared test.
All p-values were two-sided. All statistical analyses 
were performed using R, version 3.6.3 (R Foundation for 
Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria).
Results
Sample characteristics
A total of 660 observations reported by 540 partici-
pants were included in the analytic sample (Fig. 1). The 
median number of questionnaires completed by these 
participants was 1 (quartile 1–3:1–1, range 1–4). Using 
the most recent observations, 262 (48.5%) of 540 par-
ticipants reported witnessing an overdose event in the 
pre-enactment period and 278 (51.2%) in the post-enact-
ment period. Among this sample (Table  1), 284 (52.6%) 
reported calling EMS at the most recent overdose event. 
The sample included 321 (59.4%) males, 288 (53.3%) of 
white ethnicity/ancestry, and the median age was 40.4 
(quartile 1–3: 28–52) years. Other characteristics are pre-
sented in Table 1. Among the 284 participants who called 
EMS, 213 (75.0%) reported that the ambulance arrived at 
the most recent overdose scene (Table 2). In addition to 
calling EMS, 111 (39.1%) reported helping the individual 
(e.g., first aid), 102 (35.9%) reported administering nalox-
one, and 28 (9.9%) reported someone else helped the 
individual.
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Primary analyses
In the multivariable logistic regression analysis (Table 3), 
residency in the DTES (adjusted odds ratio [AOR] 1.96; 
95% confidence interval [CI] 1.23–3.13), living in a SRO 
(AOR 0.51; 95% CI 0.30–0.86), and ever administering 
naloxone three or more times (AOR 2.00; 95% CI 1.08–
3.74) were significantly and positively associated with 
EMS-calling.
Secondary analyses
As shown in Fig.  2, the prevalence of EMS-calling in 
May 2016 (pre-enactment of the GSA) was 52.9% (95% 
CI 44.6–61.4). A year following enactment of the GSA in 
June 2018, the prevalence of EMS-calling was 56.2% (95% 
CI 42.7–69.6). In the interrupted time series analysis, 
we did not observe a significant level change (p = 0.465) 
between the pre- and post-enactment periods. There was 
also no statistically significant evidence in the change of 
the slope (p = 0.478) following enactment, compared to 
the pre-enactment slope (p = 0.859).
Between the pre- and post-enactment samples, we 
observed significant differences (all p < 0.05) in the fol-
lowing variables (pre-enactment vs. post-enactment): 
age (median: 38.3 vs. 42.8), < secondary school education 
Table. 1 Characteristics of people who use drugs who witnessed an overdose in Vancouver, British Columbia, between 2014 and 2018 
(n = 540)
Reference category = Did not call EMS
EMS Emergency medical services, DTES Downtown Eastside, GSA Good Samaritan Drug Overdose Act, PWUD People who use drugs
a Denotes behaviours and events in the past six months
b Police encounter refers to being stopped, searched or detained by the police
c A known person includes a sex partner or a friend
d Sex trade refers to exchanged sex for gifts, food, shelter, clothes, or money
e Injection or non-injection drug use
Characteristic Total (%) (n = 540) Called EMS (%) (n = 284, 
53%)
Did not call EMS 
(%) (n = 256, 
47%)
Age
 Median (IQR) 40.4 (28–52) 42.6 (31–53) 35.2 (26–52)
 Per year older – –
White (vs. non‑white) 286 (53.0) 152 (53.5) 134 (52.3)
Male (vs. non‑male) 321 (59.4) 167 (58.8) 154 (60.2)
 < Secondary school education 287 (53.2) 167 (58.8) 140 (54.7)
DTES  residencya 325 (60.2) 192 (67.6) 133 (52.0)
Place of  residencea
 Homeless 130 (24.1) 66 (23.2) 64 (25.0)
 Single room occupancy 252 (46.7) 129 (45.4) 123 (48.1)
 Other (e.g., apartment, house, no fixed address) 158 (29.3) 89 (31.3) 69 (27.0)
Ever incarcerated 464 (85.9) 250 (88.0) 214 (83.6)
Ever had a negative police  encounterb 361 (66.9) 250 (88.0) 171 (66.8)
Ever administered  naloxonea
 Did not administer 273 (50.6) 129 (45.4) 144 (56.3)
 One or two times 141 (26.1) 83 (29.2) 58 (22.7)
 Three or more 81 (15.0) 50 (17.6) 31 (12.1)
Witnessed a known person  overdoseac 310 (57.4) 169 (59.5) 141 (55.1)
Ever experienced an  overdosea 387 (71.7) 206 (72.5) 181 (70.7)
Involved in the sex  tradead 71 (13.2) 40 (14.1) 31 (12.1)
Involved in drug  dealinga 141 (26.1) 77 (27.1) 64 (25.0)
 Injection drug use 243 (45.0) 136 (47.9) 107 (41.8)
  Heroine 207 (38.3) 113 (39.8) 94 (36.7)
 Stimulants, defined as powder or crack cocaine or crystal 
 methamphetaminee
200 (37.0) 110 (38.7) 90 (35.2)
 Cannabis 165 (30.6) 76 (26.8) 89 (34.8)
Post‑enactment period 278 (51.8) 146 (51.4) 132 (51.6)
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(58.4% vs. 48.2%), place of residence (homeless: 27.5% vs. 
20.9%; SRO: 48.6 vs. 45.0%; other 24.1% vs. 34.2%), ever 
administered naloxone (did not administer: 62.2% vs. 
39.6%; one or two times: 21.8% vs. 30.2%; three or more 
times: 7.6% vs. 21.9%), witnessed a known person over-
dose (67.1% vs. 48.2%), involved in drug dealing (30.9% 
vs. 21.6%), and ever had a negative police encounter 
(74.1% vs. 60.1%) (as shown in the Web Appendix).
In the sub-analysis, 278 participants responded to the 
post-enactment period questionnaire (data not shown). 
The characteristics among this sample remained similar 
to the overall sample (Table  1), except a higher propor-
tion of participants reported ever administering nalox-
one three or more times (82, 29.5%). Among this sample, 
154 (55.4%) individuals reported calling EMS at the most 
recent overdose event, and 81 (29.1%) were identified as 
having accurate knowledge of the GSA. The prevalence of 
EMS-calling was 51 (33.1%) among those who had accu-
rate knowledge of the GSA and 30 (24.2%) among those 
who did not with no evidence of statistically significant 
difference (p = 0.095).
Discussion
In this study of 540 community-recruited PWUD who 
witnessed an overdose event, EMS was called approxi-
mately half of the time, which is similar to rates reported 
in other settings [11]. In the multivariable analysis, those 
who reported residence in the DTES, living in a SRO 
and three or more naloxone administrations were more 
likely to call EMS at the witnessed overdose event. In 
the interrupted time series analysis, no statistically sig-
nificant differences in the monthly prevalence of EMS-
calling between pre- and post-GSA enactment periods 
were observed. In the sub-analysis, less than one third of 
those who witnessed an overdose had accurate knowl-
edge of the GSA, and there was no statistically significant 
relationship between accurate knowledge of the GSA and 
EMS-calling.
We found that those who resided in the DTES were 
more likely to call EMS, which is a finding contrary to 
past research in this setting. Specifically, a recent eth-
nographic study found that in response to regular police 
presence in the DTES, some PWUD felt compelled to 
choose between responding to the overdose indepen-
dently, not responding or risking potential arrest by 
recruiting EMS [41]. In this regard, the DTES may not 
be an environment conducive to EMS-calling for PWUD. 
However, our finding may reflect another characteris-
tic of this neighbourhood, which is the concentration of 
many low-threshold harm reduction and health services 
sites where many PWUD work as peer workers in this 
neighbourhood [42, 43]. Specifically, DTES residents may 
be more likely to work as peer workers and be aware of 
the importance of calling EMS or used to calling EMS 
through their work.
We also found that overdose witnesses who reported 
living in SROs were less likely to call EMS compared to 
those living in other private residences (e.g., apartment, 
house, no fixed address). Although we cannot determine 
the setting of the witnessed overdose event in our study, 
the British Columbia Coroners Service report that pri-
vate residences and SROs have been the most common 
places where fatal overdoses occurred [44]. Indeed, stud-
ies in Canada and the USA have shown that EMS is less 
likely to be called when an overdose occurs in a private 
setting [6, 7, 12, 44, 45]. Our finding suggests that there 
may be characteristics of SROs that additionally hinder 
EMS-calling compared to other private residences. In 
particular, SRO tenants are subject to restrictions that 
are not typical to other privately housed people, includ-
ing limits to guests, curfews, and codes of conduct (e.g., 
“crime free addendums”) [46]. In this regard, qualitative 
research has shown that the living environment of SROs 
do not meet the survival needs of PWUD in our set-
ting [46]. In addition,  this qualitative study documented 
many reports of unlawful evictions that forced people 
into homelessness [46]. This fear of losing housing and 
homelessness has also been documented to be a reason 
for PWUD in Denver, Colorado to avoid EMS-calling 
[8]. A recent study in our setting also found that only a 
quarter of those living in SROs had accurate knowledge 
of the GSA and a considerable portion of the sample had 
overestimated the protections provided by the GSA [28]. 
Taken together with our findings, the living environment 
and building policies of SROs seem to undermine the 
aims of the GSA. To support EMS-calling in SROs there 
is a need to reduce the fear of eviction through policy 
reform that aims to increase tenancy security and align 
housing policies with the aim of the GSA [46]. Another 
Table. 2 Other responses to the reported witnessed overdose 
event among those who called EMS (n = 284)
Participants could provide more than one response
EMS Emergency medical services, OPS Overdose prevention site, SCS Supervised 
consumption site
Response n = 284 (%)
I called EMS and the ambulance came 213 (75.0%)
I called EMS and I helped (e.g., provided first aid) 111 (39.1%)
I called EMS and administered naloxone 102 (35.9%)
I called EMS and someone else helped 28 (9.9%)
I called EMS only 17 (6.0%)
I called EMS and I was at an OPS/SCS 13 (4.6%)
I called EMS and the person came on their own 9 (3.2%)
I called EMS and then I left 1 (0.4%)
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possible intervention could be a tenant- or peer-led over-
dose response team [47], where individuals are trained 
in overdose response and provided access to naloxone. A 
pilot project in our setting has demonstrated the feasibil-
ity and acceptability of this programme among PWUD 
living in SROs [47].
In addition, we found that those who had ever admin-
istered naloxone three or more times were more likely 
to report calling EMS. Among those who called EMS, 
over a third (35.9%) reported also administering nalox-
one at the witnessed overdose event. Our finding could 
be conceived as an ineffective overdose response that 
necessitated calling EMS [48, 49]. This interpretation 
is consistent with another study in British Columbia, 
Canada, that found that bystanders who administered 
three or more naloxone ampoules at an overdose event 
were more likely to call EMS [31]. In addition, PWUD in 
New York, USA, have reported delaying engaging EMS 
as they thought they could handle the situation indepen-
dently [6]. However, our finding could also be indicative 
of the amount of experience PWUD have in managing an 
overdose situation. For instance, those who administer 
naloxone frequently could be more comfortable or better 
Table. 3 Bivariable and multivariable logistic regression analysis of factors associated with EMS‑calling among PWUD in Vancouver, 
British Columbia (n = 540)
DTES Downtown Eastside, EMS Emergency medical services, PWUD People who use drugs
Reference category = Did not call EMS
a Denotes behaviours and events in the past six months
b Police encounter refers to being stopped, searched or detained by the police
c A known person includes a sex partner or a friend
d Sex trade refers to exchanged sex for gifts, food, shelter, clothes, or money
e Injection or non-injection drug use
f Stimulants refer to powder or crack cocaine or crystal methamphetamine
Characteristic Unadjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI)




Per year older 1.02 (1.01–1.03) 0.004 1.02 (1.00–1.03) 0.090
White (vs. non‑white) 1.02 (0.73–1.44) 0.897 1.09 (0.72–1.63) 0.690
Male (vs. non‑male) 0.88 (0.61–1.27) 0.493 0.91 (0.58–1.42) 0.683
 < Secondary school education 0.91 (0.64–1.27) 0.570 0.85 (0.56–1.27) 0.424
DTES  residencya 1.93 (1.36–2.74)  < 0.001 1.96 (1.23–3.13) 0.005
Place of residencea
Homeless 0.80 (0.50–1.27) 0.347 0.71 (0.38–1.31) 0.278
Single room occupancy 0.81 (0.54–1.21) 0.310 0.51 (0.30–0.86) 0.013
Other (e.g., apartment, house, no fixed address) Reference Reference –
Ever incarcerated 1.44 (0.89–2.36) 0.140 1.14 (0.63–2.06) 0.666
Ever had a negative police  encounterb 1.00 (0.70–1.44) 0.979 0.93 (0.60–1.45) 0.764
Ever administered naloxonea
Did not administer Reference – Reference –
One or two times 1.60 (1.06–2.42) 0.026 1.50 (0.94–2.43) 0.093
Three or more 1.80 (1.09–3.01) 0.023 2.00 (1.08–3.74) 0.029
Witnessed a known person  overdoseac 1.20 (0.85–1.69) 0.299 1.08 (0.71–1.65) 0.714
Ever experienced an  overdosea 1.09 (0.75–1.59) 0.637 0.85 (0.54–1.34) 0.498
Involved in the sex  tradead 1.18 (0.71–1.96) 0.520 1.19 (0.62–2.30) 0.605
Involved in drug  dealinga 1.12 (0.76–1.64) 0.577 1.06 (0.64–1.76) 0.815
At least daily drug use
Injection drug use 1.28 (0.91–1.80) 0.156 1.02 (0.63–1.67) 0.925
Heroine 1.14 (0.80–1.61) 0.464 1.11 (0.67–1.82) 0.689
Stimulantsef 1.17 (0.82–1.66) 0.390 1.11 (0.71–1.75) 0.651
Cannabis 0.68 (0.47–0.98) 0.037 0.72 (0.46–1.12) 0.144
Post‑enactment period 0.99 (0.71–1.39) 0.971 0.81 (0.52–1.25) 0.344
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recognize the need to call EMS, but research is needed to 
confirm this.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to longitudi-
nally evaluate temporal changes in the monthly preva-
lence of calling EMS during an overdose following the 
enactment of the GSA. Our findings show no statisti-
cally significant changes in the monthly prevalence of 
EMS-calling between the pre- and post-GSA enact-
ment periods. Further, in the post-enactment period, we 
observed no statistically significant link between having 
accurate knowledge of the GSA and calling EMS. In addi-
tion, low levels of accurate knowledge of the GSA were 
found among those who witnessed an overdose in the 
sub-analysis, warranting additional education of this law. 
Given the mixed findings with regard to the effective-
ness of GSLs [26], our findings underscore the need for 
future research to investigate the effectiveness of these 
laws. Our findings also suggest that additional measures 
are needed to strengthen GSL policies to increase the 
appeal to PWUD. One possible method to strengthen 
these laws is to include legal immunities for drug traf-
ficking charges. Over a quarter of our sample (26.1%) 
had reported being involved in drug dealing, which may 
indicate an increased reluctance to call EMS given the 
lack of immunities provided for drug trafficking charges. 
Given that many PWUD are engaged in drug dealing 
for survival [50, 51], legal immunities for drug dealing 
are warranted. Taken together, innovative strategies are 
needed to reduce all possible repercussions associated 
with EMS-calling for PWUD, as these have been shown 
to cause PWUD to delay and avoid EMS-calling [6–8, 
12–14].
During our study period, there was a significant 
increase in the number of overdose-related deaths and 
a policy change by the Vancouver Police Department 
(VPD) that could have influenced the findings. Specifi-
cally, the British Columbia Coroners Service reported 
an approximately fourfold increase in overdose-related 
deaths per year (369 to 1550) between 2014 and 2018 
[52]. As per VPD’s non-attendance policy at overdose 
events [53], the VPD states that attendance at overdose 
events will only occur if the overdose results in a fatal-
ity or if EMS has requested for their assistance. Thus, it 
is conceivable that police presence at overdose events 
increased over our study period with the increase in 
the number of fatal overdoses, but further research is 
needed to confirm this. In addition, in January 2018, the 
VPD increased routine police surveillance in the DTES, 
where the majority of our participants reported residence 
in [54]. This action has been shown to undermine the 
aims of the GSA and exacerbate PWUD’s mistrust with 
EMS-calling [41]. In this way, it is unclear whether the 
increased police surveillance affected EMS-calling rates 
and undermined the impact of the GSA in our setting. 
Further attention is needed to align police practices with 
the aim of the GSA.
Our findings have several limitations. Our measure-
ment of knowledge was not validated among participants. 
Nonetheless, we note that it was created in consultation 




Change in intercept 
after Enactment 72.358 97.079 0.465
Pre-enactment slope -0.073 0.405 0.859
Change in slope 
after Enactment -1.566 2.168 0.478
05/2017
Enactment of the GSA
Fig. 2 An interrupted time series analysis: calling emergency medical services (EMS) and the Good Samaritan Drug Overdose Act (GSA)
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and informed by public educational material on the GSA 
that was created and disseminated by the local lawyer’s 
group for public legal education purposes [40]. In the 
interrupted time series analysis, the gap in our data cor-
responds to a full year before and after the enactment 
of the GSA. This reduces our ability to make inferences 
of the longitudinal impact of the GSA on EMS-calling. 
However, the post-enactment period data used are con-
sistent with another longitudinal study that had no gap 
in data and lagged GSA policy in the year the law was 
enacted to account for potential lagged effects of imple-
mentation [55]. Secondly, we also observed significant 
differences in some sample characteristics between the 
pre- and post-enactment samples that may have intro-
duced some bias into our study  (see Additional file  1). 
Although we are unable to determine the direction of 
bias, the pre-enactment sample was younger and exhib-
ited more markers of social marginalization (i.e., higher 
levels of homelessness, living in SROs, negative encoun-
ters with the police, and involvement in drug dealing) 
and had less experience administering naloxone than 
the post-enactment sample. Considering our findings 
that those who lived in SROs were less likely to call EMS, 
and those who had experience administering naloxone 
many times were more likely to call EMS, we hypoth-
esize that the post-enactment sample would have been 
more likely to call EMS compared to the pre-enactment 
sample. However, we did not find a significant associa-
tion between the post-enactment period and EMS-call-
ing even in bivariable analyses. This may reflect some 
threats to history that were not accounted for, such as 
the increased police surveillance in the DTES during the 
post-enactment period (discussed previously). Thirdly, 
due to the cross-sectional study design used in the mul-
tivariable analysis, the temporal relationship between the 
exposures and the outcome are indeterminate. In addi-
tion, the selective nature of our sample reduces the abil-
ity for our results to be generalized to all PWUD. Further, 
the majority of our measures were self-reported, which 
may introduce some response bias into our study. Spe-
cifically, we are unable to determine the direction of bias 
for those self-reporting EMS-calling, although the rates 
reported in our study are similar to those found among 
PWUD in other settings [11]. In addition, self-reported 
measures have been shown to be generally reliable and 
valid among PWUD [56–58].
Conclusion
In this study, we assessed factors associated with EMS-
calling and the impact of a GSL among PWUD in a set-
ting with a community-wide overdose crisis. Among 
our sample, EMS was called about half the time, with 
those who administered naloxone three or more times 
more likely to call EMS. Of concern, individuals liv-
ing in SROs were less likely to call EMS, indicating the 
need to support EMS-calling among SRO residents. 
This may include policy reform to increase tenancy 
security during medical emergencies and considera-
tions of a tenant- or peer-led overdose response team 
at SROs. We did not observe statistically significant 
differences in the rates of EMS-calling pre- and post-
enactment of the GSA or in the prevalence of accu-
rate knowledge of the GSA between those who did 
and did not call EMS. Further research is needed to 
establish the effectiveness of these laws and to exam-
ine EMS-calling among PWUD in other settings. As 
the overdose crisis continues, further effort is also 
urgently needed to increase EMS-calling rates, includ-
ing reducing all possible repercussions associated with 
EMS-calling.
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